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October 07, 2009

The demise of the dollar

Source: The Independent

In a graphic illustration of the new world order, Arab states have launched secret moves with China, Russia and France to stop using the US currency for oil trading

By Robert Fisk

Tuesday, 6 October 2009

In the most profound financial change in recent Middle East history, Gulf Arabs are planning – along with China, Russia, Japan and France – to end dollar dealings for oil, moving instead to a basket of currencies including the Japanese yen and Chinese yuan, the euro, gold and a new, unified currency planned for nations in the Gulf Co-operation Council, including Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar.

Secret meetings have already been held by finance ministers and central bank governors in Russia, China, Japan and Brazil to work on the scheme, which will mean that oil will no longer be priced in dollars.

The plans, confirmed to The Independent by both Gulf Arab and Chinese banking sources in Hong Kong, may help to explain the sudden rise in gold prices, but it also augurs an extraordinary transition from dollar markets within nine years.

The Americans, who are aware the meetings have taken place – although they have not discovered the details – are sure to fight this international cabal which will include hitherto loyal allies Japan and the Gulf Arabs. Against the background to these currency meetings, Sun Bigan, China's former special envoy to the Middle East, has warned there is a risk of deepening divisions between China and the US over influence and oil in the Middle East. "Bilateral quarrels and clashes are unavoidable," he told the Asia and Africa Review. "We cannot lower vigilance against hostility in the Middle East over energy interests and security."

This sounds like a dangerous prediction of a future economic war between the US and China over Middle East oil – yet again turning the region's conflicts into a battle for great power supremacy. China uses more oil incrementally than the US because its growth is less energy efficient. The transitional currency in the move away from dollars, according to Chinese banking sources, may well be gold. An indication of the huge amounts involved can be gained from the wealth of Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar who together hold an estimated $2.1 trillion in dollar reserves.

The decline of American economic power linked to the current global recession was implicitly acknowledged by the World Bank president Robert Zoellick. "One of the legacies of this crisis may be a recognition of changed economic power relations," he said in Istanbul ahead of meetings this week of the IMF and World Bank. But it is China's extraordinary new financial power – along with past anger among oil-producing and oil-consuming nations at America's power to interfere in the international financial system – which has prompted the latest discussions involving the Gulf states.

Brazil has shown interest in collaborating in non-dollar oil payments, along with India. Indeed, China appears to be the most enthusiastic of all the financial powers involved, not least because of its enormous trade with the Middle East.

China imports 60 per cent of its oil, much of it from the Middle East and Russia. The Chinese have oil production concessions in Iraq – blocked by the US until this year – and since 2008 have held an $8bn agreement with Iran to develop refining capacity and gas resources. China has oil deals in Sudan (where it has substituted for US interests) and has been negotiating for oil concessions with Libya, where all such contracts are joint ventures.

Furthermore, Chinese exports to the region now account for no fewer than 10 per cent of the imports of every country in the Middle East, including a huge range of products from cars to weapon systems, food, clothes, even dolls. In a clear sign of China's growing financial muscle, the president of the European Central Bank, Jean-Claude Trichet, yesterday pleaded with Beijing to let the yuan appreciate against a sliding dollar and, by extension, loosen China's reliance on US monetary policy, to help rebalance the world economy and ease upward pressure on the euro.

Ever since the Bretton Woods agreements – the accords after the Second World War which bequeathed the architecture for the modern international financial system – America's trading partners have been left to cope with the impact of Washington's control and, in more recent years, the hegemony of the dollar as the dominant global reserve currency.

The Chinese believe, for example, that the Americans persuaded Britain to stay out of the euro in order to prevent an earlier move away from the dollar. But Chinese banking sources say their discussions have gone too far to be blocked now. "The Russians will eventually bring in the rouble to the basket of currencies," a prominent Hong Kong broker told The Independent. "The Brits are stuck in the middle and will come into the euro. They have no choice because they won't be able to use the US dollar."

Chinese financial sources believe President Barack Obama is too busy fixing the US economy to concentrate on the extraordinary implications of the transition from the dollar in nine years' time. The current deadline for the currency transition is 2018.

The US discussed the trend briefly at the G20 summit in Pittsburgh; the Chinese Central Bank governor and other officials have been worrying aloud about the dollar for years. Their problem is that much of their national wealth is tied up in dollar assets.

"These plans will change the face of international financial transactions," one Chinese banker said. "America and Britain must be very worried. You will know how worried by the thunder of denials this news will generate."

Iran announced late last month that its foreign currency reserves would henceforth be held in euros rather than dollars. Bankers remember, of course, what happened to the last Middle East oil producer to sell its oil in euros rather than dollars. A few months after Saddam Hussein trumpeted his decision, the Americans and British invaded Iraq.

October 08, 2007

India and Myanmar

Source: PINR Dispatch

Recent developments in the gas field projects of Myanmar have served to highlight the intense resource diplomacy that is ongoing in the region. The government of Myanmar withdrew India's (under the Gas Authority of India Limited or GAIL) status of "preferential buyer" on the A1 and A3 blocks of its offshore natural gas fields and instead declared their intent to sell the gas to PetroChina. The offshore gas fields of the Shwe project in the Bay of Bengal have estimates of 4.8 trillion cubic feet (TcF) for the current blocks with more exploration ongoing. The controlling interests in the two blocks are Daewoo International (60 percent), O.N.G.C. Videsh Ltd (20 percent), GAIL Ltd (10 percent) and Korea Gas Corporation (10 percent).

The most viable of the proposed pipeline routes for moving the gas to India would have proceeded through Myanmar's Arakan state before entering India's Mizoram and Assam provinces and finally terminating in West Bengal at the proposed Jagdishpur-Haldia distribution line.

Implications for India

First of all, India has clearly lost an important diplomatic initiative in the attempt to counter Chinese influence in Myanmar. Even after the deal was sweetened with US$20 million in "soft credit" and the proposed construction of a power plant in Myanmar, it would appear that Indian influence was quietly denied by the inevitability of China's international support for Myanmar. Beijing's use of its veto to keep Myanmar's human rights record off of the U.N. Security Council agenda turned out to be more important to the Myanmar junta than the economic incentives. Despite support from pro-India voices within the upper echelon, like that of Vice Senior General Maung Aye, the sharp turn in the sales decision serves to illustrate the depth of the relationship currently enjoyed by China and Myanmar. Maung Aye signaled as much as early as January 2007, when he refused to provide guarantees that India would gain access to the gas.

Secondly, the economic implications for India are significant. Recent reductions in the estimates of offshore gas in their own eastern blocks have increased demand to find sources outside of India's borders. The Myanmar fields offered a strong possibility to replace these sources. In particular, the pipeline was destined for the northeastern provinces of India, which are among the most power-starved provinces in the country. If the gas was destined for domestic use, the development-security nexus suggests that the power and resulting development, along with greater cooperation on cross-border counter-insurgency efforts, may have had a strong chance of success in defusing the secessionist movements in the northeastern Indian provinces.

Finally, the pipeline seemed set to heighten attempts for greater integration and further military and economic cooperation along the Myanmar-Indian border. Trade initiatives to date have failed to establish in the Indian northeastern border regions, while security initiatives have occurred in a stovepipe fashion with only communication between the two states rather than truly cooperative exercises. India will likely make more overt efforts in the future to establish a stronger presence in the face of Chinese diplomatic successes in Myanmar. It is likely that joint military initiatives in the border region will be initiated and more direct military aid like the proposed light attack helicopter sales from India to Myanmar will continue. Transfers of military equipment have increased significantly in the last two years between India and Myanmar, while joint counter-insurgency operations have been proposed, which would see an unprecedented level of cooperation, and therefore much higher counter-insurgency activity, between the two countries. These efforts would have had a far greater chance of success when combined with the development possibilities that the pipeline may have provided.

Implications for Myanmar

First of all, on the diplomatic front, the military junta has signaled where its strength lies. The military government has had a long history of a strong relationship with China which it would not risk in this scenario. It is likely that the junta recognizes the desire for India to play a stronger role in the region, thus giving it a stronger position in its dealings with New Delhi. The resources of Myanmar have allowed it to bypass international sanctions in the past and will now allow it to negotiate with its Asian neighbors in order to win necessary international support and recognition. The risk of angering India to the point of withdrawal of support was minimal; indeed, GAIL was criticized by India's External Affairs Ministry for not pursuing the agreement with a strong enough commitment to see it completed. However, the junta must continue to walk a fine line between alienating neighbors, already suspicious of China's growing influence in the region, undermining its own sovereignty and losing the support of its largest strategic partner, China, by playing it off against other regional interests.

Additionally, the recent efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (A.S.E.A.N.) to condemn the slow progress of national reconciliation may have refocused efforts within the junta to place diplomatic pressure via China onto members of A.S.E.A.N. China has recently been increasing its influence within A.S.E.A.N. and stands as the more active (between India and China) peripheral player in the A.S.E.A.N. orbit. Thus, by using its resources as a bargaining chip, Myanmar may have gained promises from China to use its influence to dampen A.S.E.A.N. members' concerns over the reconciliation process.

Secondly, the strength of the Myanmar position lies in the strong economic demand for resources by all of its neighbors. Bids for the sale of the gas were competitive and Myanmar will not lose much in economic terms for the decision to sell to PetroChina. While the decision may be deemed short-sighted for its apparent slight to India's recent diplomatic advances, it does little to reduce the reality that India, Thailand and China are all in need of dependable energy in order to pursue economic development.

Another facet of this agreement is a proposed oil pipeline that would be built in conjunction with the necessary gas pipeline. This oil pipeline would be constructed by PetroChina as an alternate route to the Malacca Strait. Its origin would be at a deep water port at Ramree Island in Myanmar, built to accommodate large crude tanker ships, and would cross the country to an undisclosed point on the Chinese/Myanmar border (likely the Muse/Ruli border crossing point). The economic advantage for Myanmar would be an additional sale point for their onshore and offshore oil blocks along with the economic spin off of a major trans-shipment point. China's vulnerability inherent in the reliance on the Malacca Strait may well have driven the junta's decision to rescind India's preferential buyer status.

The recent price hikes in domestic fuel that sparked protest in Yangon and resulted in the arrest of a number of former student leaders from the 1988 uprising demonstrates the thin line of economic vulnerability upon which the junta balances. The 1988 uprising that resulted in the current suspended constitution was also sparked by a troubled economy. The junta will need to balance its need for foreign currency, gained through resource rents, with the demands of a population that has not accrued much benefit from the current junta's economic policy. Much of the gas being exported to date and in the future would, arguably, be better used in domestic power generation -- something that the Indian offer would have included.

Third, on the security front, agreements that have been developing alongside the gas sale agreement with India will likely not be disturbed by the decision to sell to China. The pipeline route from Shwe would have brought fewer security implications for Myanmar than for India. However, pipeline construction to the western region of Myanmar would have brought with it a larger military presence in an area of poor infrastructure on both sides of the border. In this sense, the military opportunity cost may have been a considerable chance to improve infrastructure and access to an area that has been historically inaccessible.

In addition, Myanmar military ties to the considerable narcotics and arms trade that utilizes the porous border between the two countries may have produced a conflict of interest between parties within the junta that forced the withdrawal of the pipeline project.

Conclusion

The junta is insisting that the rules of the gas fields have little to do with political decisions; rather, that it is the business as usual approach of offering the sale to the highest bidder. The decision to sell to PetroChina, however, emphasizes the complexity of resource diplomacy for all players within the region. India's current loss in the field of energy security will likely not lead to a decrease in its attempts to win greater cooperation from Myanmar over counter-insurgency efforts, but it does reveal the deep connections between China and Myanmar. This relationship will prove hard for India to compete with in the long run, especially as long as the decision-making process within the junta follows the familiar route of political considerations at the expense of sound domestic economic policy.

An important consideration, unexamined here, is that India will not likely rock the diplomatic boat as long as its companies continue to enjoy privileged access to a country that is closed to U.S. and European competition. Exploration, after all, is still ongoing in the offshore blocks while Myanmar's onshore basins remain largely untapped.

Report Drafted By:
Gideon Lundholm

The Economic Factors Behind the Myanmar Protests

Source: PINR Dispatch

The first sign of the current protests currently underway in Myanmar occurred in a rare display of public outrage in February 2007 over the economic conditions within the country. A small group calling themselves the Myanmar Development Committee called on the military rulers to address consumer prices, lack of health care, education and the poor electricity infrastructure. Normally unseen in Myanmar, the protest was quickly broken up after only 30 minutes of activity. Likely in response to the protests, the ruling military junta appointed Brigadier-General Than Han of the Myanmar police to the responsibility of handling civil unrest in Rangoon.

On August 15, 2007, the government made significant cuts to national fuel subsidies, which had an immediate effect of increasing the price of diesel fuel by a reported 100 percent, causing a five-fold increase in the price of compressed natural gas, and placing additional inflationary pressure on an economy already facing estimated inflation levels of 17.7 percent in 2005 and 21.4 percent in 2006.

Once again, similar to the event in February, people took to the streets in a rare display of public anger. The current demonstrations have drawn a significant number of Buddhist monks into the streets and have led to national curfews. Violence finally broke out on September 26 as security forces and protesters clashed.

The end of fuel subsidies were likely part of a larger package of reforms that the junta has been planning in order to, among other things, reduce the pressure of global fuel prices in a country that is dependent on diesel imports for its entire economy. Myanmar has an insignificant domestic refinery capacity and a chronic need for foreign currency. The latest Indian proposal intended to regain access to the Shwe gas fields has reportedly included diesel fuel exports, while a deal with Petronas of Malaysia is seeking similar arrangements. [See: "Pipeline Politics: India and Myanmar"]

The International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) and World Bank made recommendations as recently as last year along the lines of the subsidy cut as part of a larger package of reforms, critically citing the trend toward extraordinarily high budget deficits carried by the junta. The construction of a new capital, Naypyidaw, and the proposed construction of an information technology capital, Yadanabon, along with significant pay raises for civil servants and the military have placed serious pressure on government reserves. The government typically addresses such deficits by printing more money, producing the significant inflationary pressures seen today.

The involvement of private interests should not be overlooked. Leading businessman Tay Za and his holding company Htoo Trading Company may be set to profit from the privatization of the fuel distribution system within the country. In order for the move to be successful, the thriving black market in fuel needs to be eradicated, thus the necessary removal of fuel subsidies and the subsequent rise in prices throughout the country. While powerplays between junta leaders and private businessmen have been cited before as causal factors in economic policy changes, the international pattern of subsidy reduction in the face of rising global oil prices suggests that this was not the underlying motive in the move. However, it would be a fairly typical move for the junta to select reforms beneficial to its business partners rather than to the national interest.

The junta has successfully melded the Myanmar economy into one that is dependent and focused on the export of its resources. Arguably, it appears that the junta has little economic planning experience and its priorities lie in the promotion of military power. However, it has produced a situation in which little value is added to any resources, whether it is copper, timber, or energy, producing an economy dependent on imports and exposed to the volatility of resource prices. It has managed resource rents and foreign investment poorly; planned hydroelectric projects will likely be forced to export electricity due to the inability of domestic infrastructure to handle the increased load.

Similarly, the information technology project of Yadanabon, likely a response to a similar project in Malaysia, is typical of the economic oddity that the junta often embarks on with little thought to planning. Communication infrastructure within the country is archaic and will not support the proposed project. Likewise, the jatropha (physic nut tree) plantations currently being planted across the country, another junta project, will not result in any significant economic development. The fuel requires significant infrastructure to turn into bio-diesel, which likely means it will be exported in its raw form to neighboring countries while the land under plantation could arguably be better utilized to feed the population. Regardless, the aging diesel engines that are in use throughout Myanmar will not be able to burn the resulting fuel stock effectively even if the domestic infrastructure were available.

One of the factors that may exacerbate the situation is the state of Myanmar's banking sector. The junta has announced a restriction on withdrawals from banks, raising echoes of the banking crisis of 2003. These restrictions are typical for unstable times, but due to the shaky status of the private banks especially, it is likely to cause even further economic hardship for the people of Myanmar. Monks may represent the spiritual backbone of the protests, but it is the general populace who has been successfully cowed by the junta into an attitude of self-preservation, which will ultimately have to be driven to demand change.

The military has made a supreme effort to remove itself from contact with the population: barracks and bases are situated away from towns, and the new capital is a study in strategic withdrawal to the hinterland. It is the populace who has the most to lose from rampant inflation and evaporating savings, but faces an incredibly resilient and increasingly isolated military that has kept a stranglehold on power since 1962.

The last major uprising in Myanmar occurred in 1988. The underlying cause of the revolt was economic and resulted in violent repression by the military. The outcome of the current protest could be similar. Regardless, due to the decades of military involvement in the economy, dependency on resource exports and a high rate of corruption that pervades the country, the necessary economic improvements will not come easily. Even with peaceful political change, without significant international oversight, the overwhelming precedence of military intervention and control in the country will likely return Myanmar to state-sponsored economic mismanagement.

September 07, 2007

Ruble Rumble

Source: The Wall Street Journal Online

By JUDY SHELTON
August 30, 2007; Page A10

American fighter jets scrambled to intercept Russian bombers earlier this month near the island of Guam. It was the first time since the end of the Cold War that the Kremlin sought to provoke a U.S. response. It likely will not be the last. Fueled by revenues from energy exports, Russia appears bent on ratcheting up tensions.

But don't expect the next foray to take place over international waters. Vladimir Putin laid bare his ambitions at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June by calling for a "new international financial architecture" to provide a base for economic development. Russia's next move is to challenge U.S. supremacy in world financial markets.

The notion of nudging America off its central perch in global economic affairs hardly seems plausible. But Russia's leader strikes a chord with other emerging-market economies -- Brazil, China, India -- when he describes current monetary and financial arrangements as "archaic, undemocratic and unwieldy."

Given the recent turmoil in world financial markets, Mr. Putin can expect heightened interest in his pitch for new regional alliances "based on trust and mutually beneficial integration" versus continued dependence on global institutions like the International Monetary Fund. Both Europe and Asia blame U.S. credit woes for their own unsettled markets. And newly independent nations on the periphery of established trade and security blocs have their own reasons to align with powerful patrons.

Mr. Putin even suggests that central banks should begin to hold reserves in a wider selection of currencies than dollars and euros in recognition of the "existing balance of power." It's hard to miss the implication: the ruble as a global reserve currency.

Is the man serious? The only reason the European Central Bank, say, or China's central bank, might hold reserves in rubles would be to pay for purchases from Russia. Today it is possible to buy Russian oil and gas using dollars or euros. The leading market exchanges for conducting international energy transactions are located in New York and London. But that is why officials at the White House, the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury should be scrambling right now.

Mr. Putin is more than serious. He is determined to establish a world-class oil exchange on Russian territory and shift energy business away from existing global financial centers. A new facility is being readied in St. Petersburg's historic Bourse -- an imposing, white-colonnaded Greek Revival building that dominates the majestic sweep of the Strelka, or Spit, of Vasilievsky Island in the Neva delta and which is visible from the Winter Palace -- that will open to market traders within months and where transactions will be denominated in rubles.

It's a daring gambit and it constitutes no less than a demand for new international monetary arrangements on the scale of the post-World War II Bretton Woods agreement. "The global economy has experienced a transition," Mr. Putin notes pointedly. "Fifty years ago, 60% of world gross domestic product came from the Group of Seven industrial nations. Today 60% of world GDP comes from outside the G7."

Mr. Putin's plan to confront the privileged global role of U.S. currency resonates with Russians eager to recapture nationalist pride. Lampooning the sickly American dollar is popular with members of the Kremlin-financed youth group Nashi (meaning "ours"). And it potentially accommodates the burgeoning economic aspirations and swelling egos of Russia's partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and China.

China, like Russia, bristles at its second-tier status within the global financial architecture. Harangued by the U.S. over exchange-rate policies, China has recently been flexing its monetary muscle by hinting that it might dump a portion of its considerable dollar reserves. The prospect of such a shock to the U.S. economy in the midst of a housing slump threatens to bring the whole edifice crashing down. Throw in statements of support from oil-producers Venezuela and Iran, and you have the makings of a devastating dollar rout.

If Russia insists that its energy clients pay in rubles, we cannot expect our allies to strenuously resist. Europe purchases nearly 30% of its energy from Russia. Rising energy demand in Asia will likewise boost demand for rubles as Russia targets China, India and Japan. Last month, Japan quietly acquiesced to Iran's request that it switch from dollars to yen in payment for Iranian oil.

Can U.S. leaders and financial authorities meet the challenge from the Kremlin? Is America prepared to offer its own proposals for establishing more stable currency and financial conditions for global trade? Or are we just interested in protecting our turf?

The next Bretton Woods should be launched as an earnest initiative from the nation that gave birth to democratic capitalism. Not as an act of aggression from a pumped-up Russian pretender.

Ms. Shelton is an economist and author of "Money Meltdown" (Free Press, 1994).

August 18, 2007

Russia sends long bombers back on patrol

Source: Yahoo - Associated Press

By IVAN SEKRETAREV, Associated Press Writer 1 minute ago

CHEBARKUL TESTING RANGE, Russia - President Vladimir Putin placed strategic bombers back on long-range patrol for the first time since the Soviet breakup, sending a tough message to the United States on Friday hours after a major Russian military exercise with China.

Putin reviewed the first Russian-Chinese joint exercise on Russian soil before announcing that 20 strategic bombers had been sent far over the Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic oceans — showing off Moscow's muscular new posture and its growing military ties with Beijing.

"Starting today, such tours of duty will be conducted regularly and on the strategic scale," Putin said. "Our pilots have been grounded for too long. They are happy to start a new life."

Putin said halting long-range bombers after the Soviet collapse had hurt Russia's security because other nations — an oblique reference to the United States — had continued such missions.

"I have made a decision to resume regular flights of Russian strategic aviation," Putin said in nationally televised remarks. "We proceed from the assumption that our partners will view the resumption of flights of Russia's strategic aviation with understanding."

U.S.-Russian relations have been strained over Washington's criticism of Russia's democracy record, Moscow's objections to U.S. missile defense plans and differences over crises such as the Iraq war. But the Bush administration downplayed the significance of the renewed patrols.

"We certainly are not in the kind of posture we were with what used to be the Soviet Union. It's a different era," State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said. "If Russia feels as though they want to take some of these old aircraft out of mothballs and get them flying again, that's their decision."

Soviet bombers routinely flew missions to areas where nuclear-tipped cruise missiles could be launched at the United States. They stopped in the post-Soviet economic meltdown. Booming oil prices have allowed Russia to sharply increase its military spending.

Russian Air Force spokesman Col. Alexander Drobyshevsky said that Friday's exercise involved Tu-160, Tu-95 and Tu-22M bombers, tanker aircraft and air radars. NATO jets were scrambled to escort the Russian aircraft over the oceans, he said, according to the ITAR-Tass news agency.

Eleven Russian military planes — including strategic bombers and fighter jets — carried out maneuvers west of NATO member Norway on Friday, a military official said.

Norway sent F-16 fighter jets to observe and photograph the Russian planes, which rounded the northern tip of Norway and flew south over the Norwegian Sea toward the Faeroe Islands before turning back, said Brig. Gen. Ole Asak, chief of the Norwegian Joint Air Operations Center.

A pair of Russian Tu-95 strategic bombers approached the Pacific Island of Guam — home to a major U.S. military base — this month for the first time since the Cold War.

Last month, two similar bombers briefly entered British air space but turned back after British fighter jets intercepted them. Norwegian F-16s were also scrambled when the Tu-95s headed south along the Norwegian coast in international air space.

"This is a significant change of posture of Russian strategic forces," Alexander Pikayev, a senior military analyst with the Moscow-based Institute for World Economy and International Relations, told The Associated Press. "It's a response to the relocation of NATO forces closer to Russia's western border."

NATO has expanded in recent years to include the former Soviet republics of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia as well as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.

As of the beginning of the year, Russia had 79 strategic bombers, according to data exchanged with the United States under the START I arms control treaty. At the peak of the Cold War, the Soviet long-range bomber fleet numbered several hundred.

Friday's war games with China near the Urals Mountain city of Chelyabinsk involved some 6,000 troops from both countries, along with soldiers from four ex-Soviet Central Asian nations that are part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a regional group dominated by Moscow and Beijing.

The former Cold War rivals share a heightening distrust of what they see as the United States' outsized role in global politics, and they have forged a "strategic partnership" aimed at counterbalancing Washington's policies.

The United States, Russia and China are locked in a tense rivalry for influence in Central Asia, the site of vast hydrocarbon resources. Washington supports plans for pipelines that would carry oil and gas to the West and bypass Russia, while Moscow has maneuvered to control exports. China also has shown a growing appetite for energy to power its booming economy.

Putin, Chinese leader Hu Jintao and other leaders of the SCO nations attended the joint exercise, which followed their summit Thursday in Kyrgyzstan's capital Bishkek.

The summit concluded with a communique that sounded like a thinly veiled warning to the United States to stay away from the region: "Stability and security in Central Asia are best ensured primarily through efforts taken by the nations of the region on the basis of the existing regional associations."

Putin hailed the exercise — which involved dozens of aircraft and hundreds of armored vehicles countering a mock attack by terrorists and insurgents striving to take control of energy resources — "as another step to strengthen relations between our countries." Hu said the maneuvers "underlined the SCO's readiness to confront terror."

The exercises underlined that "the SCO wants to show that Central Asia is its exclusive sphere of responsibility," said Ivan Safranchuk, an analyst at World Security Institute

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov said the exercise was not aimed at the United States.

"I don't see anything anti-American in the SCO exercise," he was quoted as saying by the ITAR-Tass news agency.

The SCO was created 11 years ago to address religious extremism and border security issues in Central Asia. In recent years, the group has grown into a bloc aimed at defying U.S. interests in the region.

In 2005, the SCO called for a timetable to be set for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from two member countries, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan evicted U.S. forces later that year, but Kyrgyzstan still has a U.S. base, which supports operations in nearby Afghanistan. Russia also maintains a military base in Kyrgyzstan.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose country has SCO observer status, attended the summit for the second consecutive year. On Thursday, he echoed Russia's criticism of U.S. plans to deploy missile interceptors in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic, saying they were a threat to the entire region.

___

Associated Press Writer Vladimir Isachenkov contributed to this report from Moscow.

August 15, 2007

Iranian Unit to Be Labeled 'Terrorist'

Source: WashingtonPost.com

U.S. Moving Against Revolutionary Guard

By Robin Wright
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, August 15, 2007; A01

The United States has decided to designate Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, the country's 125,000-strong elite military branch, as a "specially designated global terrorist," according to U.S. officials, a move that allows Washington to target the group's business operations and finances.

The Bush administration has chosen to move against the Revolutionary Guard Corps because of what U.S. officials have described as its growing involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as its support for extremists throughout the Middle East, the sources said. The decision follows congressional pressure on the administration to toughen its stance against Tehran, as well as U.S. frustration with the ineffectiveness of U.N. resolutions against Iran's nuclear program, officials said.

The designation of the Revolutionary Guard will be made under Executive Order 13224, which President Bush signed two weeks after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks to obstruct terrorist funding. It authorizes the United States to identify individuals, businesses, charities and extremist groups engaged in terrorist activities. The Revolutionary Guard would be the first national military branch included on the list, U.S. officials said -- a highly unusual move because it is part of a government, rather than a typical non-state terrorist organization.

The order allows the United States to block the assets of terrorists and to disrupt operations by foreign businesses that "provide support, services or assistance to, or otherwise associate with, terrorists."

The move reflects escalating tensions between Washington and Tehran over issues including Iraq and Iran's nuclear ambitions. Iran has been on the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1984, but in May the two countries began their first formal one-on-one dialogue in 28 years with a meeting of diplomats in Baghdad.

The main goal of the new designation is to clamp down on the Revolutionary Guard's vast business network, as well as on foreign companies conducting business linked to the military unit and its personnel. The administration plans to list many of the Revolutionary Guard's financial operations.

"Anyone doing business with these people will have to reevaluate their actions immediately," said a U.S. official familiar with the plan who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the decision has not been announced. "It increases the risks of people who have until now ignored the growing list of sanctions against the Iranians. It makes clear to everyone who the IRGC and their related businesses really are. It removes the excuses for doing business with these people."

For weeks, the Bush administration has been debating whether to target the Revolutionary Guard Corps in full, or only its Quds Force wing, which U.S. officials have linked to the growing flow of explosives, roadside bombs, rockets and other arms to Shiite militias in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Quds Force also lends support to Shiite allies such as Lebanon's Hezbollah and to Sunni movements such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Although administration discussions continue, the initial decision is to target the entire Guard Corps, U.S. officials said. The administration has not yet decided when to announce the new measure, but officials said they would prefer to do so before the meeting of the U.N. General Assembly next month, when the United States intends to increase international pressure against Iran.

Formed in 1979 and originally tasked with protecting the world's only modern theocracy, the Revolutionary Guard took the lead in battling Iraq during the bloody Iran-Iraq war waged from 1980 to 1988. The Guard, also known as the Pasdaran, has since become a powerful political and economic force in Iran. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad rose through the ranks of the Revolutionary Guard and came to power with support from its network of veterans. Its leaders are linked to many mainstream businesses in Iran.

"They are heavily involved in everything from pharmaceuticals to telecommunications and pipelines -- even the new Imam Khomeini Airport and a great deal of smuggling," said Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations. "Many of the front companies engaged in procuring nuclear technology are owned and run by the Revolutionary Guards. They're developing along the lines of the Chinese military, which is involved in many business enterprises. It's a huge business conglomeration."

The Revolutionary Guard Corps -- with its own navy, air force, ground forces and special forces units -- is a rival to Iran's conventional troops. Its naval forces abducted 15 British sailors and marines this spring, sparking an international crisis, and its special forces armed Lebanon's Hezbollah with missiles used against Israel in the 2006 war. The corps also plays a key role in Iran's military industries, including the attempted acquisition of nuclear weapons and surface-to-surface missiles, according to Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The United States took punitive action against Iran after the November 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, including the breaking of diplomatic ties and the freezing of Iranian assets in the United States. More recently, dozens of international banks and financial institutions reduced or eliminated their business with Iran after a quiet campaign by the Treasury Department and State Department aimed at limiting Tehran's access to the international financial system. Over the past year, two U.N. resolutions have targeted the assets and movements of 28 people -- including some Revolutionary Guard members -- linked to Iran's nuclear program.

The key obstacle to stronger international pressure against Tehran has been China, Iran's largest trading partner. After the Iranian government refused to comply with two U.N. Security Council resolutions dealing with its nuclear program, Beijing balked at a U.S. proposal for a resolution that would have sanctioned the Revolutionary Guard, U.S. officials said.

China's actions reverse a cycle during which Russia was the most reluctant among the veto-wielding members of the Security Council. "China used to hide behind Russia, but Russia is now hiding behind China," said a U.S. official familiar with negotiations.

The administration's move comes amid growing support in Congress for the Iran Counter-Proliferation Act, which was introduced in the Senate by Gordon Smith (R-Ore.) and in the House by Tom Lantos (D-Calif.). The bill already has the support of 323 House members.

The administration's move could hurt diplomatic efforts, some analysts said. "It would greatly complicate our efforts to solve the nuclear issue," said Joseph Cirincione, a nuclear proliferation expert at the Center for American Progress. "It would tie an end to Iran's nuclear program to an end to its support of allies in Hezbollah and Hamas. The only way you could get a nuclear deal is as part of a grand bargain, which at this point is completely out of reach."

Such sanctions can work only alongside diplomatic efforts, Cirincione added.

"Sanctions can serve as a prod, but they have very rarely forced a country to capitulate or collapse," he said. "All of us want to back Iran into a corner, but we want to give them a way out, too. [The designation] will convince many in Iran's elite that there's no point in talking with us and that the only thing that will satisfy us is regime change."

Staff researcher Madonna Lebling contributed to this report.

December 29, 2006

The Proposed Iranian Oil Bourse

Source: Axis of Logic

The Proposed Iranian Oil Bourse
By Krassimir Petrov
Dec 29, 2006, 05:48

I. Economics of Empires

A nation-state taxes its own citizens, while an empire taxes other nation-states. The history of empires, from Greek and Roman, to Ottoman and British, teaches that the economic foundation of every single empire is the taxation of other nations. The imperial ability to tax has always rested on a better and stronger economy, and as a consequence, a better and stronger military. One part of the subject taxes went to improve the living standards of the empire; the other part went to strengthen the military dominance necessary to enforce the collection of those taxes.

Historically, taxing the subject state has been in various forms—usually gold and silver, where those were considered money, but also slaves, soldiers, crops, cattle, or other agricultural and natural resources, whatever economic goods the empire demanded and the subject-state could deliver. Historically, imperial taxation has always been direct: the subject state handed over the economic goods directly to the empire.

For the first time in history, in the twentieth century, America was able to tax the world indirectly, through inflation. It did not enforce the direct payment of taxes like all of its predecessor empires did, but distributed instead its own fiat currency, the U.S. Dollar, to other nations in exchange for goods with the intended consequence of inflating and devaluing those dollars and paying back later each dollar with less economic goods—the difference capturing the U.S. imperial tax. Here is how this happened.

Early in the 20th century, the U.S. economy began to dominate the world economy. The U.S. dollar was tied to gold, so that the value of the dollar neither increased, nor decreased, but remained the same amount of gold. The Great Depression, with its preceding inflation from 1921 to 1929 and its subsequent ballooning government deficits, had substantially increased the amount of currency in circulation, and thus rendered the backing of U.S. dollars by gold impossible. This led Roosevelt to decouple the dollar from gold in 1932. Up to this point, the U.S. may have well dominated the world economy, but from an economic point of view, it was not an empire. The fixed value of the dollar did not allow the Americans to extract economic benefits from other countries by supplying them with dollars convertible to gold.

Economically, the American Empire was born with Bretton Woods in 1945. The U.S. dollar was not fully convertible to gold, but was made convertible to gold only to foreign governments. This established the dollar as the reserve currency of the world. It was possible, because during WWII, the United States had supplied its allies with provisions, demanding gold as payment, thus accumulating significant portion of the world’s gold. An Empire would not have been possible if, following the Bretton Woods arrangement, the dollar supply was kept limited and within the availability of gold, so as to fully exchange back dollars for gold. However, the guns-and-butter policy of the 1960’s was an imperial one: the dollar supply was relentlessly increased to finance Vietnam and LBJ’s Great Society. Most of those dollars were handed over to foreigners in exchange for economic goods, without the prospect of buying them back at the same value. The increase in dollar holdings of foreigners via persistent U.S. trade deficits was tantamount to a tax—the classical inflation tax that a country imposes on its own citizens, this time around an inflation tax that U.S. imposed on rest of the world.

When in 1970-1971 foreigners demanded payment for their dollars in gold, The U.S. Government defaulted on its payment on August 15, 1971. While the popular spin told the story of “severing the link between the dollar and gold”, in reality the denial to pay back in gold was an act of bankruptcy by the U.S. Government. Essentially, the U.S. declared itself an Empire. It had extracted an enormous amount of economic goods from the rest of the world, with no intention or ability to return those goods, and the world was powerless to respond— the world was taxed and it could not do anything about it.

From that point on, to sustain the American Empire and to continue to tax the rest of the world, the United States had to force the world to continue to accept ever-depreciating dollars in exchange for economic goods and to have the world hold more and more of those depreciating dollars. It had to give the world an economic reason to hold them, and that reason was oil.

In 1971, as it became clearer and clearer that the U.S Government would not be able to buy back its dollars in gold, it made in 1972-73 an iron-clad arrangement with Saudi Arabia to support the power of the House of Saud in exchange for accepting only U.S. dollars for its oil. The rest of OPEC was to follow suit and also accept only dollars. Because the world had to buy oil from the Arab oil countries, it had the reason to hold dollars as payment for oil. Because the world needed ever increasing quantities of oil at ever increasing oil prices, the world’s demand for dollars could only increase. Even though dollars could no longer be exchanged for gold, they were now exchangeable for oil.

The economic essence of this arrangement was that the dollar was now backed by oil. As long as that was the case, the world had to accumulate increasing amounts of dollars, because they needed those dollars to buy oil. As long as the dollar was the only acceptable payment for oil, its dominance in the world was assured, and the American Empire could continue to tax the rest of the world. If, for any reason, the dollar lost its oil backing, the American Empire would cease to exist. Thus, Imperial survival dictated that oil be sold only for dollars. It also dictated that oil reserves were spread around various sovereign states that weren’t strong enough, politically or militarily, to demand payment for oil in something else. If someone demanded a different payment, he had to be convinced, either by political pressure or military means, to change his mind.

The man that actually did demand Euro for his oil was Saddam Hussein in 2000. At first, his demand was met with ridicule, later with neglect, but as it became clearer that he meant business, political pressure was exerted to change his mind. When other countries, like Iran, wanted payment in other currencies, most notably Euro and Yen, the danger to the dollar was clear and present, and a punitive action was in order. Bush’s Shock-and-Awe in Iraq was not about Saddam’s nuclear capabilities, about defending human rights, about spreading democracy, or even about seizing oil fields; it was about defending the dollar, ergo the American Empire. It was about setting an example that anyone who demanded payment in currencies other than U.S. Dollars would be likewise punished.

Many have criticized Bush for staging the war in Iraq in order to seize Iraqi oil fields. However, those critics can’t explain why Bush would want to seize those fields—he could simply print dollars for nothing and use them to get all the oil in the world that he needs. He must have had some other reason to invade Iraq.

History teaches that an empire should go to war for one of two reasons: (1) to defend itself or (2) benefit from war; if not, as Paul Kennedy illustrates in his magisterial The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, a military overstretch will drain its economic resources and precipitate its collapse. Economically speaking, in order for an empire to initiate and conduct a war, its benefits must outweigh its military and social costs. Benefits from Iraqi oil fields are hardly worth the long-term, multi-year military cost. Instead, Bush must have went into Iraq to defend his Empire. Indeed, this is the case: two months after the United States invaded Iraq, the Oil for Food Program was terminated, the Iraqi Euro accounts were switched back to dollars, and oil was sold once again only for U.S. dollars. No longer could the world buy oil from Iraq with Euro. Global dollar supremacy was once again restored. Bush descended victoriously from a fighter jet and declared the mission accomplished—he had successfully defended the U.S. dollar, and thus the American Empire.

II. Iranian Oil Bourse

The Iranian government has finally developed the ultimate “nuclear” weapon that can swiftly destroy the financial system underpinning the American Empire. That weapon is the Iranian Oil Bourse slated to open in March 2006. It will be based on a euro-oil-trading mechanism that naturally implies payment for oil in Euro. In economic terms, this represents a much greater threat to the hegemony of the dollar than Saddam’s, because it will allow anyone willing either to buy or to sell oil for Euro to transact on the exchange, thus circumventing the U.S. dollar altogether. If so, then it is likely that almost everyone will eagerly adopt this euro oil system:

The Europeans will not have to buy and hold dollars in order to secure their payment for oil, but would instead pay with their own currencies. The adoption of the euro for oil transactions will provide the European currency with a reserve status that will benefit the European at the expense of the Americans.

The Chinese and the Japanese will be especially eager to adopt the new exchange, because it will allow them to drastically lower their enormous dollar reserves and diversify with Euros, thus protecting themselves against the depreciation of the dollar. One portion of their dollars they will still want to hold onto; a second portion of their dollar holdings they may decide to dump outright; a third portion of their dollars they will decide to use up for future payments without replenishing those dollar holdings, but building up instead their euro reserves.

The Russians have inherent economic interest in adopting the Euro – the bulk of their trade is with European countries, with oil-exporting countries, with China, and with Japan. Adoption of the Euro will immediately take care of the first two blocs, and will over time facilitate trade with China and Japan. Also, the Russians seemingly detest holding depreciating dollars, for they have recently found a new religion with gold. Russians have also revived their nationalism, and if embracing the Euro will stab the Americans, they will gladly do it and smugly watch the Americans bleed.

The Arab oil-exporting countries will eagerly adopt the Euro as a means of diversifying against rising mountains of depreciating dollars. Just like the Russians, their trade is mostly with European countries, and therefore will prefer the European currency both for its stability and for avoiding currency risk, not to mention their jihad against the Infidel Enemy.
Only the British will find themselves between a rock and a hard place. They have had a strategic partnership with the U.S. forever, but have also had their natural pull from Europe. So far, they have had many reasons to stick with the winner. However, when they see their century-old partner falling, will they firmly stand behind him or will they deliver the coup de grace? Still, we should not forget that currently the two leading oil exchanges are the New York’s NYMEX and the London’s International Petroleum Exchange (IPE), even though both of them are effectively owned by the Americans. It seems more likely that the British will have to go down with the sinking ship, for otherwise they will be shooting themselves in the foot by hurting their own London IPE interests. It is here noteworthy that for all the rhetoric about the reasons for the surviving British Pound, the British most likely did not adopt the Euro namely because the Americans must have pressured them not to: otherwise the London IPE would have had to switch to Euros, thus mortally wounding the dollar and their strategic partner.

At any rate, no matter what the British decide, should the Iranian Oil Bourse accelerate, the interests that matter—those of Europeans, Chinese, Japanese, Russians, and Arabs—will eagerly adopt the Euro, thus sealing the fate of the dollar. Americans cannot allow this to happen, and if necessary, will use a vast array of strategies to halt or hobble the operation’s exchange:

Sabotaging the Exchange—this could be a computer virus, network, communications, or server attack, various server security breaches, or a 9-11-type attack on main and backup facilities.

Coup d’état—this is by far the best long-term strategy available to the Americans.

Negotiating Acceptable Terms & Limitations—this is another excellent solution to the Americans. Of course, a government coup is clearly the preferred strategy, for it will ensure that the exchange does not operate at all and does not threaten American interests. However, if an attempted sabotage or coup d’etat fails, then negotiation is clearly the second-best available option.

Joint U.N. War Resolution—this will be, no doubt, hard to secure given the interests of all other member-states of the Security Council. Feverish rhetoric about Iranians developing nuclear weapons undoubtedly serves to prepare this course of action.

Unilateral Nuclear Strike—this is a terrible strategic choice for all the reasons associated with the next strategy, the Unilateral Total War. The Americans will likely use Israel to do their dirty nuclear job.

Unilateral Total War—this is obviously the worst strategic choice. First, the U.S. military resources have been already depleted with two wars. Secondly, the Americans will further alienate other powerful nations. Third, major dollar-holding countries may decide to quietly retaliate by dumping their own mountains of dollars, thus preventing the U.S. from further financing its militant ambitions. Finally, Iran has strategic alliances with other powerful nations that may trigger their involvement in war; Iran reputedly has such alliance with China, India, and Russia, known as the Shanghai Cooperative Group, a.k.a. Shanghai Coop and a separate pact with Syria.
Whatever the strategic choice, from a purely economic point of view, should the Iranian Oil Bourse gain momentum, it will be eagerly embraced by major economic powers and will precipitate the demise of the dollar. The collapsing dollar will dramatically accelerate U.S. inflation and will pressure upward U.S. long-term interest rates. At this point, the Fed will find itself between Scylla and Charybdis—between deflation and hyperinflation—it will be forced fast either to take its “classical medicine” by deflating, whereby it raises interest rates, thus inducing a major economic depression, a collapse in real estate, and an implosion in bond, stock, and derivative markets, with a total financial collapse, or alternatively, to take the Weimar way out by inflating, whereby it pegs the long-bond yield, raises the Helicopters and drowns the financial system in liquidity, bailing out numerous LTCMs and hyperinflating the economy.

The Austrian theory of money, credit, and business cycles teaches us that there is no in-between Scylla and Charybdis. Sooner or later, the monetary system must swing one way or the other, forcing the Fed to make its choice. No doubt, Commander-in-Chief Ben Bernanke, a renowned scholar of the Great Depression and an adept Black Hawk pilot, will choose inflation. Helicopter Ben, oblivious to Rothbard’s America’s Great Depression, has nonetheless mastered the lessons of the Great Depression and the annihilating power of deflations. The Maestro has taught him the panacea of every single financial problem—to inflate, come hell or high water. He has even taught the Japanese his own ingenious unconventional ways to battle the deflationary liquidity trap. Like his mentor, he has dreamed of battling a Kondratieff Winter. To avoid deflation, he will resort to the printing presses; he will recall all helicopters from the 800 overseas U.S. military bases; and, if necessary, he will monetize everything in sight. His ultimate accomplishment will be the hyperinflationary destruction of the American currency and from its ashes will rise the next reserve currency of the world—that barbarous relic called gold.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Recommended Reading
William Clark “The Real Reasons for the Upcoming War in Iraq
William Clark “The Real Reasons Why Iran is the Next Target

About the Author
Krassimir Petrov (Krassimir_Petrov@hotmail.com) has received his Ph. D. in economics from the Ohio State University and currently teaches Macroeconomics, International Finance, and Econometrics at the American University in Bulgaria. He is looking for a career in Dubai or the U. A. E.

Also by this author
“China’s Great Depression”
“Masters of Austrian Investment Analysis”
“Austrian Analysis of U.S. Inflation”
“Oil Performance in a Worldwide Depression”
See: www.financialsense.com/editorials/petrov/main.html


~~~~~ Notes from the Editor of Energy Bulletin~~~~~

An excellent and thought provoking article by Krassimir Petrov!

However, I think perhaps it's not entirely correct to state that "critics can’t explain why Bush would want to seize those fields." The Bush regime are probably aiming to set themselves up as policeman of the Middle East oil fields, 'protecting' oil supply to Asia and Europe in return for various advantages at any future negotiation tables. Meanwhile billions of dollars of unaccountable no-bid contracts have been handed to corporations with ties to Bush administration, and the Iraqi oil industry is set to be privatised. So the reasons for the war are rich and varied. However Petrov has given us one of the clearest explanations yet of one of the most important, and certainly least understood, motivations for the war.

-AF

http://www.energybulletin.net/12125.html

December 28, 2006

Tense countdown to Russia-Belarus 'gas war' begins

Source: Agence France-Presse

by Sebastian Smith
December 28, 2006

MOSCOW (AFP) - The tense countdown to Russia's threatened cutting of gas supplies to Belarus, which could also hit deliveries to western Europe, has entered its final hours of confrontation over pricing.

Negotiations continued in Moscow Thursday, said Sergei Kupriyanov, spokesman for Russia's state-controlled monopoly Gazprom.

He refused to give details of the talks, slightly more than three days before a deadline laid down by Russia which is causing concern in the
European Union.

Gazprom chairman Alexei Miller has warned that gas supplies to Belarus will be turned off at 10:00 am in Moscow (0700 GMT) on Monday if Belarus, an ex-Soviet republic, does not agree to a more than doubling of price.

With Gazprom and Belarus both warning of a knock-on effect for western European customers who rely on Belarus as a transit point for Russian gas, the crisis increasingly resembles the showdown between Russia and Ukraine at New Year's 2006.

"A second gas war has been declared," said the respected Vedomosti business daily in Moscow. "Belarus will be cut off, like Ukraine."

The European Union, where Russian imports accounted for 24 percent of total gas requirements in 2005, is watching closely.

"I call on the two parties to reach as soon as possible a satisfactory agreement that does not put in question gas transits to the EU," Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs said in a statement.

"The Commission is following the situation very closely since it may affect gas supplies to the European Union."

Gazprom accuses Belarus of preparing to siphon off gas destined for Europe in the event of a cut to its domestic supplies and has warned that compensation for a loss in volumes might be impossible.

Belarus argues that if it is unable to agree with Gazprom on a new contract for its domestic supplies in 2007, then the contract governing transit of Russian gas westward will also become void.

Gazprom says the price increase would bring Belarus' fee closer to international standards and away from Soviet-style subsidies, while critics accuse the giant company of using energy as a weapon to bring neighbouring countries under Kremlin dominance.

Ironically, the dispute pits Belarus' President Alexander Lukashenko against the one major country that supports his authoritarian regime.

In contrast, Gazprom's strong-arm tactics in Ukraine 12 months ago, culminating with the brief cut-off in gas, were widely seen as part of a Kremlin strategy to weaken strongly pro-Western President Viktor Yushchenko.

The current crisis is on a smaller scale than the Ukraine episode, since just 20 percent of Russian gas exports to Europe go through Belarus, compared to 80 percent through Ukraine.

Last winter was also one of the coldest recorded in Europe.

So far, this winter is one of the mildest and so demand for energy is lower. According to the European Union, reserves are big enough to deal with any temporary shortfall.

Russia's media predicted that Belarus, a country of 10.3 million people sandwiched between Russia and the European Union, will find the cost too high to maintain defiance for long.

"Unpredictable he may be, but Lukashenko will not continue the conflict with Russia for long," Vedomosti quoted an unnamed Kremlin official as saying, suggesting that Lukashenko might accept a compromise in which Belarus took a loan from Moscow that covered the increased gas price.

However, commentators in Belarus said the country was ready to stand firm.

"In the end they will come to a deal. Belarus has its own cards in this fight -- transit, Russian military bases stationed on its territory, political relations," said analyst Andrei Fyodorov.

Belarus currently pays Gazprom a highly subsidised 46.68 dollars per 1,000 cubic metres of gas and Gazprom originally demanded an increase to 200 dollars, which is closer to western European prices, unless Belarus agreed to sell 50 percent of its pipeline operator Beltransgaz.

This would give the Russian state-owned giant an important strategic foothold on the European Union's eastern border.

Gazprom has since reduced that demand to 105 dollars per 1,000 cubic metres -- 75 dollars per 1,000 cubic metres in cash payments, plus the equivalent of another 30 dollars in shares of Beltransgas.

Belarus is so far refusing to accept the deal.

"Russia is not only after extra revenues, but wants to take under control certain parts of the property in neighbouring countries," Belarussian parliament deputy Anatoly Krasutsky said. "The government should have diversified its energy sources earlier, but you learn by your mistakes."

December 27, 2006

As the symptoms of peak oil and gas production become more evident, the competition for these resources will likely also become more visible. There is trouble brewing in Eastern Europe over former Soviet countries who are unhappy with the prices they are being forced to pay Russia for badly needed natural gas supplies.

Since Russia supplies much of Europe with natural gas through pipelines that run through Belarus and Ukraine, those countries have a degree of leverage over Russia in their negotiations for the price of their own gas deliveries.

------

Source: Reuters

By Andrei Makhovsky and Dmitry Zhdannikov
2 hours, 16 minutes ago

MINSK/MOSCOW (Reuters) - Belarus issued an implicit threat that it could stop Russian gas deliveries through its pipelines to western Europe unless Russia's gas monopoly Gazprom relented on demands Minsk pay steep price increases in 2007.

The threat is likely to revive unpleasant memories of gas cuts to Europe last year when Russia was locked in a similar pricing row with Ukraine. But Belarus ships smaller volumes of gas to Europe via its territory and Russia said Europe was safe as Gazprom (GAZP.MM) had stockpiled extra gas in Germany.
"We are inter-dependent. If I don't have a domestic gas supply contract, Gazprom won't have a transit deal," Belarus's Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Semashko said at Minsk airport late on Tuesday after his return from failed talks in Moscow.

About 80 percent of Russian exports to Europe are pumped via Ukraine, with the rest going through Belarus. Russia supplies a quarter of Europe's gas to more than 20 countries.

Belarus, whose President Alexander Lukashenko is accused in the West of crushing human rights, has long been a Russian ally.

Vladimir Putin's distaste for Belarus's Soviet-style economic policy and reluctance to share enterprises with Moscow.

Semashko did not say whether Belarus was prepared to stop all gas transit via its territory.

Two years ago, Minsk took no such action in a similar dispute, but Gazprom accused it of taking gas from transit pipelines for its domestic needs. Gazprom said it viewed Semashko's latest comments as a new threat to steal gas.

Two years ago, the row generated no major criticism of Russia in the West due to Lukashenko's poor political image.

Last year, Russia came under fire from politicians in the European Union and the United States following gas cuts to Ukraine. The dispute accentuated rocky relations between Moscow and Ukraine's pro-Western leadership, since tempered by the return of a prime minister friendlier to Russia.

U.S. ACCUSATION

The sniping reached a climax when Vice President smaller neighbors.

Some analysts say Moscow may decide against resorting to cuts this year given the Ukrainian experience and the growing importance of Germany as its top trade partner.

"Belarus has a very strong negotiating position with its gas transportation infrastructure and we believe that Gazprom will have to be very flexible with its Belarus pricing policy," said Yelena Savchik from Renaissance Capital brokerage.

But a Gazprom source told Reuters some top employees had been told to cancel New Year holidays: "It looks exactly like one year ago with Ukraine."

Gazprom still hopes for a deal to allow Belarus to receive supplies and Gazprom to transit gas to Poland and Germany.

Gazprom says it offered major concessions to Belarus on Tuesday such as lowering the proposed price to $110 per 1,000 cubic meters from the previous proposal of $200. On Wednesday, it lowered its offer still further to $105. Gazprom has also said the country could pay part of its bill in assets.

Belarus now pays $46.7, or as much as consumers in Russia. By comparison, Gazprom will charge Moldova $170 in 2007 and Georgia $235, while consumers in Europe pay over $250.

December 23, 2006

Russia eager to appoint foreign fund manager for petrodollars

Source: Times Online UK

Julian Evans in Moscow

The Russian Government is considering hiring a foreign fund manager for a proposed oil-and-gas fund that it hopes will account, eventually, for 60 per cent of its GDP, or about $500 billion (£255 billion) at present estimates, a source at the Ministry of Finance told The Times.

It would be one of the biggest funds in the world. The Government has stowed $83 billion in petrodollars in its Stabilisation Fund, which the central bank manages and is invested entirely in AAA-rated US Treasury bills.

However, the ministry wants to take more risks with its money. It is proposing that the Government set up two new funds, including a reserve fund, accounting for 7 per cent to 10 per cent of GDP, which, a ministry source said would probably be managed by the central bank. However, it would be allowed to invest in all investment-grade assets. The fund would be used to manage oil price shocks.

The second fund would be a savings fund and, eventually, it would account for 60 per cent of GDP, according to sources. This fund could be dipped into by the Government. It would have a more aggressive risk profile and be allowed to invest in foreign equities, corporate debt and money-market instruments.

A source from the Ministry of Finance said: “We are considering who should manage this. It could be a foreign investment firm, the central bank or a state-owned bank.” The state-owned Vnesh-econombank (VEB) looks like a favourite to win the enormous mandate. Not to be confused with Vneshtorgbank (VTB), VEB is a Soviet-era state-owned bank whose original mandate was to manage the debt of the USSR. However, its ambitious management, led by Vladimir Dmitriev, its chief executive, is expanding its remit aggressively.

A botched reform process in 2003 meant that Russian citizens did not have the time or education to choose private fund managers for their state pensions, so about 95 per cent of pensions ended up being managed by VEB. Private fund managers, including Deutsche UFG and Raiffeisen Bank, were disappointed.

VEB has since put almost all the pension fund in Russian government bonds, so the state pension fund significantly underperforms privately managed pension funds. VEB is considered a Silovik bank, meaning that it has close ties to the Russian security services. It is thought to have covertly shifted federal money to the state-owned Rosneft in December 2004 to help it to acquire Yuganskneftegaz, Yukos’s main asset, in a controversial auction. The Kremlin denies that Rosneft used federal money to buy the asset.

VEB is also the favourite to become the new Russian development bank, which the Government wants to set up next year to help to renovate the country’s infrastructure via multibillion-dollar public- private partnership deals. And now it is favoured to manage what will be one of the biggest investment funds in the world.

A source at the Ministry of Finance said: “VEB manages the Government’s debt, so perhaps it should also invest the Government’s money. However, it has little experience of active investment management . . . The problem is that few private Russian fund managers have much experience, either. Only foreign managers have much experience.” Hiring foreign managers would be sensitive, but it would allay fears that the Government’s petrodollars could be misused.

Another option being considered is setting up a special agency to manage the fund, under the auspices of the central bank but employing a large team of professional investment managers, similar to what Norway did to manage its huge petrofund.

Capitalism at its finest

- Russian Government has accumulated $83 billion in oil revenues in its Stabilisation Fund

- Fund, managed by the central bank, is invested 45% in US Treasury bills, 45% in euroland government bonds and 10% in gilts

- The Kremlin wants to set up two new funds. One will have a conservative risk profile, investing only in investment-grade securities

- The other fund will be allowed to invest in equities, corporate bonds and other instruments

- Eventually, sources say, it will account for 60% of Russian GDP, which could be $500 billion, making it one of the biggest funds in the world

- The Government has not decided who will manage the fund, but is considering holding tenders and accepting bids from foreign managers

UN Imposes First Sanctions on Iran's Nuclear Program

Source: Bloomberg

By Bill Varner

Dec. 23 (Bloomberg) -- The United Nations Security Council voted 15 to 0 to impose sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program for the first time, including a ban on acquisition of materials and technology that might be used to build an atomic bomb.

The measure demands that Iran halt uranium enrichment and heavy-water projects that the U.S. and its European allies have said may lead to the development of nuclear weapons. It freezes the financial assets of 12 named individuals and 11 groups such as the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran.

The resolution also requires the UN's nuclear watchdog agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency, to report on Iran's compliance within 60 days. ``Further appropriate measures'' such as economic penalties and severance of diplomatic relations will be required if Iran doesn't comply, it says.

``We are sending Iran an unambiguous message that there are serious repercussions to its continued disregard of its obligations and defiance of this body,'' U.S. Acting Ambassador Alejandro Wolff said. ``We look forward to Iran's full, unconditional and immediate compliance with this resolution.''

The vote, the result of more than two months of negotiations largely aimed at winning Russia's support, occurred as the U.S. and Britain are close to increasing naval power in the Persian Gulf in a display of military resolve, the New York Times reported, citing unidentified Pentagon and military officials.

Serious Message

``Russia views this resolution as a serious message being sent to Iran regarding the need more actively and more openly to cooperate with the IAEA to lift or resolve the remaining concerns relating to their nuclear program,'' Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin said. ``We hope that Iran will correctly and very seriously perceive the contents of this resolution and take the necessary measures to redress their situation.''

The Security Council action will likely add to tensions in the region and may contribute to rising oil prices in 2007, according to Ian Bremmer, president of the Eurasia Group, a New York-based organization that analyzes political risk for businesses. Iran is the second-biggest oil producer in the Middle East.

``Oil markets won't move very much on this resolution,'' Bremmer said. ``But we think Iran is one of the biggest risks out there and that there will be escalation of tensions in 2007 as Iran retaliates. They can disrupt markets by driving proxy wars in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.''

Retaliation

Senior Iranian lawmakers said today that their parliament might retaliate by blocking inspections by the IAEA, according to IRNA, the state-run Iranian news agency. Legislation to suspend inspections has been passed by the parliament's security and foreign affairs committee, the agency reported.

At the UN, Iranian Ambassador Javad Zarif said suspension of enrichment activities was ``not a solution,'' that it was instead a ``temporary, stop-gap measure'' that didn't work from November 2003 to February 206. Without specifying how Iran would react to the vote, he said the ``days of bullying, pressure and intimidation by some nuclear-weapons holders are gone.''

Zarif said the Security Council was guilty of hypocrisy for taking no action against Israel after Prime Minister Ehud Olmert appeared to confirm recently that Israel has nuclear weapons.

The U.S. and its European allies, Zarif said, which ``pushed this council to take groundless punitive measures against Iran's peaceful nuclear program, have systematically prevented any action to nudge the Israeli regime towards submitting itself to the rules governing the nuclear non-proliferation regime.''

Russia agreed to vote for the resolution after Britain, France and Germany dropped a proposed travel ban on Iranian officials and narrowed the scope of the trade embargo to ``proliferation sensitive'' materials and technology. An earlier version of the text, first circulated in October, would have banned any item that could contribute to Iran's nuclear or missile programs.

Nuclear Power Plant

The resolution's sponsors also deleted any mention of the Bushehr commercial nuclear power plant that Russia is helping Iran build. An earlier text would have barred delivery of fuel to the plant.

``It is an important symbolic move, but it is hard to see that this puts sufficient pain on Iran to compel it to do anything,'' said Bruce Reidel, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington. ``At best, this is a warning shot across the bow of the Iranian state, a long way from authorizing the use of force.''

Iran ignored a July 31 resolution requiring it to suspend enrichment activities by Aug. 31, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, pronounced ah-ma-deen-ah-ZHAD, has said his government will continue its nuclear program.

Vigilance

The resolution creates a Security Council committee to monitor implementation of the sanctions and calls on UN member nations to ``exercise vigilance'' regarding the international travel of the 12 Iranian officials and any ``specialized teaching or training'' of Iranian nationals.

UN member governments are to report to the committee within 60 days on steps they have taken to implement the resolution.

The sanctions would be suspended by Iran's decision to suspend enrichment activities and terminated by a report that the government in Tehran has complied with all UN Security Council and IAEA requirements.

Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns said in a conference call with reporters that the U.S. would follow the vote with new efforts to persuade other nations to enact the same type of financial and trade sanctions on Iran that the U.S. has had in place for 27 years.

``Russia and China tell us that want to deny Iran a nuclear weapons capability,'' Burns said. ``We want to see more vigorous action by them. We would like to see them stop selling arms to Iran and limit export credits to Iran. We think it is time to an end for business as usual.''

To contact the reporter on this story: Bill Varner in the United Nations at wvarner_at_bloomberg.net.
Last Updated: December 23, 2006 13:02 EST

December 21, 2006

Energy Rivalries Set to Heat Up

Source: Houston Chronicle.com

Dec. 21, 2006, 11:18AM
By ALEX NICHOLSON AP Business Writer
© 2006 The Associated Press

MOSCOW — A golden statue of Saparmurat Niyazov rotates on a pedestal in Turkmenistan's capital to always face the sun _ a testament to the leader's personality cult and a garish product of the Central Asian nation's vast energy wealth.

Now, the autocratic president's death on Thursday is set to fuel a rivalry between Russia, the United States and China for access to the former Soviet republic's massive gas reserves in what analysts call a repeat of 19th-century rivalries in the region.

"Turkmenistan has returned as a key piece in the new Great Game," said Alfa Bank strategist Chris Weafer, referring to Russia and Britain's jostling for pre-eminence in Central Asia in the 1800s. "It is a big prize."

Over the past year Niyazov, who personally brokered the country's energy deals, had sought to balance Russia's influence _ courting Turkish and, in particular Chinese companies, to help explore and develop its nearly 3 trillion cubic meters of proven gas reserves.

Russia's state-controlled gas monopoly OAO Gazprom controls the only transit route for Turkmen gas exports to other former Soviet states and Europe.

Keen to lock in fresh energy sources to feed its exploding economy, China saw its efforts rewarded with Niyazov's promise to pipe 30 billion cubic meters of gas beginning in January 2009. It also won an invitation last month to tap the giant Iolotan fields, which the late president declared, to international disbelief, to contain 7 trillion cubic meters of natural gas _ or more than even Saudi Arabia's proven reserves.

Washington, meanwhile, has lobbied for a pipeline out of Turkmenistan across the Caspian Sea to the west, bypassing Russian territory. That would meet a U.S. strategy of tapping sources of crude and gas outside the Middle East, and drawing Caspian states away from Russia and closer to the West.

Niyazov ultimately proved "too difficult" for U.S. officials to deal with, Weafer said.

The Turkmen leader used revenues from energy investments to nourish lavish construction projects _ a huge, man-made lake in the Kara Kum desert, a vast cypress forest to change the desert climate, a ski resort and a 40-meter (130-foot) pyramid to celebrate the anniversary of the country's independence from the Soviet Union.

"Russia will want to retain its political influence in the country and one assumes that the U.S. will try to use the opportunity (of Niyazov's death) to get back in there, increase its influence and resurrect the plan for the pipeline across the Caspian," Weafer said. "But my guess is that the Chinese will have the biggest delegation at the funeral."

Jonathan Stern, director of gas research at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, says that multinational oil companies will prick up their ears at the news of Niyazov's death, but serious reforms would need to be undertaken before they could enter the promising market.

"The big guys, the people who might be interested, can't touch the place _ it doesn't come close to meeting the standards of corporate responsibility," he told The Associated Press.

"Obviously they can't afford not to look that this place and the possibility that it might open up _ it's obviously clear that they need to consider this," he said. "I just don't think we'll see any rapid developments. We need to finds out if there will be real change in status quo."

That could come in the form of some indication of democratization in the capital Ashgabat or open auctions of its hydrocarbon reserves.

"Given the resource base, it's always been at the back of peoples minds, but it's become increasingly difficult to work there because of the centralized decision-making and dominance of state-run monopolies," said analyst Hilary McCutcheon of energy consultants Wood MacKenzie. "That may be on the brink of changing."

Turkmenistan's burgeoning relationship with China has also rattled Ukraine, which relies on cheap Turkmen gas supplies to keep its domestic bill down.

Gazprom has a contract until 2009 to buy 50 billion of the 60 billion cubic meters that Turkmenistan produces annually, most of which it then re-exports to Ukraine.

While a recent price hike secured by Niyazov just months before his death suggests that pact is unlikely to be reconsidered in the near future, analysts say little will be clear until a successor is named.

Turkmenistan's State Security Council named Deputy Prime Minister Kurbanguli Berdymukhamedov the acting president, even though the Constitution required Parliament Speaker Overzgeldy Atayev to take over as acting head of state. The council said the Prosecutor General's office has opened a criminal investigation against Atayev, making him ineligible to fill in as president. The move could herald a battle for succession between rival groups in the Turkmen administration.

If Ashgabat makes good on its deal with China, and if fresh reserves are not developed apace, supplies to Ukraine could be cut, analysts say.

If that happens, Kiev would be forced to buy more expensive Russian gas, potentially putting it into a situation similar to a price fight with Gazprom last winter, which resulted in some cuts in supplies to some European cities.

October 01, 2006

Intelligence Brief: Escalating Tension between Georgia and Russia

Source: PINR

October 2, 2006

Russian troops in Georgia were put on "high alert" on Sunday and ordered to "shoot to kill if provoked" while defending Moscow's two military bases in the Caucasian country. Tensions between Russia and Georgia are escalating after Tbilisi arrested four Russian officers on September 27 on spying charges.

As a consequence, Moscow withdrew its diplomats from Tbilisi and warned that it could postpone pulling out its troops by 2008 as initially planned. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told the press on September 27 that the situation is "very serious," and, therefore, "when the U.N. Security Council will consider the Georgia-Abkhaz settlement in the next two weeks, we will insist on assessing Georgia's activities as subversive."

The crisis has its roots in the pro-Western, pro-U.S. turn of Georgian national elites epitomized by President Mikhail Saakashvili and his "Rose Revolution." The situation had already worsened in August when Georgian security forces attempted to secure control of the Abkhazian river valley of the Kodori Gorge in order to regain control of the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Tbilisi then called for the replacement of Russia as the official mediator in Georgia's regional conflicts. Moscow maintains peacekeepers there along with two military bases.

This escalation signals that Georgia is likely to become the catalyst for U.S.-Russian geopolitical conflict for strategic and economic influence in the Caucasus. Washington criticized Moscow's reaction to the officers' arrests and continues to sponsor Tbilisi's gradual integration into N.A.T.O. Saakashvili has never concealed his pro-U.S. stance and frequently accuses Russia of being the destabilizing force behind breakaway regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Although Moscow officially says that Georgia is a sovereign state and is free to join N.A.T.O., Russia is working to maintain strong influence in the Trans-Caucasus region.

As PINR pointed out on September 19, the recent Russian-backed Transdniester pro-independence referendum may be a pattern for the two Georgian separatist regions' attempts to gain national independence. The United States and N.A.T.O., however, are likely to be more active in preserving Georgia's national integrity by strongly supporting Saakashvili than they have been in Transdniester. Therefore, a continued dispute between Tbilisi and Moscow with significant U.S. and European participation on the Georgian side is to be expected in the coming months. [See: "Intelligence Brief: Transdniester Votes for Independence"]

The stakes in the southern Caucasus region are significant. Georgia and Azerbaijan form a gateway linking the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea and are vital for the control of Central Asia's massive fossil resources, as the well-known Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline testifies.

Georgia's geographic position is also critical to N.A.T.O.'s ability to secure the Black Sea region and it allows Washington to project power toward the Middle East. Furthermore, at a time of uncertainty on Turkey's E.U. accession bid and on Ankara's geostrategic orientation -- due to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's unwillingness to subscribe to U.S. military actions in Iraq -- Georgia's geostrategic importance for Washington is increasing.

Tbilisi's new pro-Western course is predicated upon a strategic relationship with the United States and N.A.T.O. and serves the purpose of a post-Soviet national elite that is eager to eliminate Russian hegemony. Disputes with Abkhazia and South Ossetia are worrying Tbilisi, but, on the other hand, they are enabling the Saakashvili administration to distract international attention from its increasingly authoritarian rule and provide him an effective ideological tool to boost nationalism and use it against remaining Russian influence.

As a consequence, tensions are likely to remain high in the coming months. While it is unlikely that Russia and N.A.T.O. will make moves that could openly put one against the other in the region, Moscow's support for separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia will probably continue. Chances that a smooth diplomatic solution to Georgia's regional issues will be implemented soon are decreasing, while Tbilisi's approach to separatism remains militaristic.

September 29, 2006

Russia: Plans to close bases in doubt

Source: Yahoo News, AP

By MISHA DZHINDZHIKHASHVILI, Associated Press Writer
September 29, 2006

TBILISI, Georgia - Russia warned on Friday that its plans to close military bases in Georgia were in doubt and Georgia claimed Russia was moving troops near their shared border, as relations between the countries deteriorated in one of their worst crises since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Tensions between Russia and Georgia, which have increased since pro-Western President Mikhail Saakashvili came to power in 2003, escalated after the arrest in Georgia on Wednesday of four Russian military officers accused of spying.

Russia has recalled its ambassador, evacuated some diplomats and their families and issued a formal protest to the United Nations. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov has denounced Georgia as a "bandit" state.

Georgia on Friday accused Russia of redeploying additional troops closer to the border and said the Russian Black Sea fleet was expected to start maneuvers in the next few days. "I would advise our colleagues to stop saber-rattling. "This is unacceptable for a democratic country and we don't understand that," Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili told reporters.

Since gaining power in the Rose Revolution, Saakashvili has pledged to move the country out of Russia's orbit, take control of breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and join NATO in 2008. Georgia's pro-Western course has vexed the Kremlin, and Georgian authorities accused Russia of backing separatists.

Tbilisi courts on Friday ordered the four Russian officers remanded in custody for two months, Anzor Khvadagiani, a Tbilisi prosecutor, told The Associated Press. A fifth serviceman also arrested Wednesday was released the next day for lack of evidence. The courts also extended the arrest of 10 Georgian citizens accused of involvement in a Russian spy ring.

Gen. Andrei Popov, commander of Russian military forces in Georgia, said Russia's obligation to close its two remaining military bases in Georgia by the end of 2008 still stands, but added that "if our servicemen are arrested and put in custody, there will be problems with the withdrawal since there will be no people left to prepare weapons for the pullout," the Interfax news agency reported.

Popov's spokesman, Col. Vladimir Kuparadze, confirmed his statement.

Russia has between 3,000 and 4,000 troops at its two military bases in Georgia proper, and 2,500 peacekeepers deployed to separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Ivanov, meeting Friday with NATO members in Slovenia, said the arrests were aimed at pushing Russian troops out of Georgia so the government could seize control of the breakaway provinces by force, and he accused unnamed newer NATO members of illegally supplying Georgia with Soviet-made weapons.

"It is absolutely clear to us that Georgia has chosen the military path, the forceful path, for resolving the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia," he said, adding that Georgia's actions were "to push Russian peacekeepers out by any means possible ... and then to submit an application to join NATO."

Two Russian planes, meanwhile, evacuated 84 diplomats and their relatives from Georgia, officials said. The Russian ambassador to Georgia, Vyacheslav Kovalenko, said after returning to Moscow that families of all Russian military in Georgia also will depart, Interfax reported.

Georgian police surrounded the Russian military headquarters in Tbilisi on Friday, hoping to detain another Russian officer accused of spying. Russia has refused to surrender the officer.

In Moscow, police blocked streets around the Georgian Embassy. They allowed some 20 nationalists to protest briefly against Georgia's president before detaining them for holding an unsanctioned rally.

Russia's ultranationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky called on Friday for "the most resolute action, up to the deployment of forces and air raids." A Kremlin-connected lawmaker, Konstantin Kosachev, said Moscow would not yield to what he called Georgia's provocation and stressed that "any forceful measures are absolutely excluded."

Separately, an official in South Ossetia claimed that masked Georgian officers shot out the tires of a car carrying four Russian peacekeepers, a woman and a child Thursday night, then ordered the men out and beat them. One peacekeeper sustained a fractured skull, according to the internationally unrecognized South Ossetian government, and Ivanov said there was proof they were "brutally beaten."

Georgian officials denied the allegations, saying police stopped a car with Russian peacekeepers, checked their documents and released them.

Russia's Foreign Ministry advised its citizens to refrain from traveling to Georgia, citing security concerns, and its embassy in Tbilisi stopped issuing visas to Georgian citizens.

Saakashvili denounced the moves as hysteria.

NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer called for "moderation and de-escalation, and that goes for both parties," and a U.S. State Department official said both sides had to work toward a solution.

Matthew J. Bryza, in Berlin for diplomatic consultations on Abkhazia, also told journalists that "Georgia has expressed its sovereign view ... that it doesn't want Russian peacekeepers on its territory. There is a question of what is prudent, and what is the most effective way of asserting that right in the case of Tbilisi."

September 22, 2006

Rob Newman's History of Oil

Fantastic explantion of the history of oil, oil's influence in war, Peak Oil and US Dollar currency hegemony. All done with humor, amusing analogies and in lay person's terms.

http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=7374585792978336967

September 08, 2006

Russian Energy Majors Eye Direct Outlet To Mediterranean

Source: Eurasia Daily Monitor
By Igor Torbakov
Friday, September 8, 2006

Russia’s ambitious attempts to cast itself as the principal energy supplier to world markets explain the new deal on an oil pipeline linking the Black Sea with the Aegean. During his September 4 visit to Greece, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a seemingly attractive offer to the Greek and Bulgarian leadership to turn their countries into energy transit hubs for Russia’s oil exports. The main result of the negotiations in Athens between Putin, Greek Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis, and Bulgarian President Georgy Parvanov was the decision to revive a long-stalled project aimed at carrying Russian crude from Bulgaria to Greece.

Following the talks, the leaders of the three countries told journalists that the final deal on the 280-kilometer $900 million pipeline linking Burgas on the Black Sea coast and Alexandroupolis on the Aegean is to be signed by the end of this year. Although no concrete dates were given as to the beginning of construction work on the pipeline, the Russian side believes that oil could start flowing by 2009. Plans call for the pipeline to initially transport 15 million tons of crude per year and increase to its full capacity, 35 million tons, by 2012. “I don't think anybody can stop [the pipeline] now,” Karamanlis asserted.

First advanced some 12 years ago as a way to reduce tanker traffic through the overcrowded Turkish Straits, the project was abandoned over disputes related to transit tariffs, ownership, and construction contracts. Furthermore, in the 1990s Russian oil companies were reluctant to make a firm commitment to supply 35-50 million tons of oil yearly to fill the pipeline: in 1996-98, oil prices on the world market went down to $8-12 dollars per barrel, and under these conditions it did not make much sense to spend additional costs on increasing supplies and conquering new markets.

Nowadays the situation has changed; there are several reasons that make Russia particularly interested in the realization of the trans-Balkan pipeline project.

First, the current sky-high oil prices, in the range of $70 dollars per barrel, have significantly boosted the financial attractiveness of the Burgas-Alexandroupolis route.

Second, the U.S.-backed Tbilisi-Baku-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, which began operating this summer after four years of construction, likely acted as a catalyst for the revival of the trans-Balkan project. When the BTC came on stream, some Russian analysts say, Moscow started worrying that it might lose the strategic competition over exports to the Balkans and Southern Europe.

Third, the congestion in the Bosporus is being exacerbated by the growing rivalry between Russia and Kazakhstan and the problems related to the throughput capacity of the pipeline operated by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) that transports the Kazakh crude from the Caspian oilfields to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. The Kazakhs have long pushed Moscow to double the capacity of the CPC pipeline to 67 million tons per year. Kazakhstan has said it plans to triple its crude exports within a decade, most of which travel through Russia via the Caspian pipeline. If Russia eventually agrees to expand the CPC pipeline, the pressure on the Bosporus will rise dramatically as a further 700,000 to 1 million barrels per day will be shipped through the Straits.

Finally, Moscow is keen to open new energy export routes to reach the lucrative European markets and reduce dependence on such “unreliable” transit countries as Ukraine.

But despite the tripartite agreement reached in Athens, there is a significant amount of uncertainty and hidden tension that might eventually derail the Burgas-Alexandroupolis project.

Energy analysts note that the shareholdings in Trans-Balkan Pipeline, the project developer, are still being negotiated. The Russian side, represented by GazpromNeft, Rosneft, and TNK-BP, is pushing for the controlling stake as the oil supplier. But other participants -- Bulgaria’s state-controlled Bulgargaz and Greece’s oil refiner Hellenic Petroleum, and pipeline constructor Prometheus -- appear to be in favor of all partners having equal stakes.

Furthermore, Bulgaria is reportedly interested in expanding the number of project participants. “We are talking about an inclusive project, not an exclusive one,” Bulgarian leader Parvanov was quoted as saying. A well-informed source close to the Athens talks told the Moscow-based daily Vremya novostei that the Bulgarian team had suggested inviting the Kazakh energy company KazMunayGaz and U.S. Chevron into the Trans-Balkan consortium. Their reasoning appears to be quite simple: as a transit country, Bulgaria is interested in guarantees to fill the pipe, and having the Kazakh and U.S. oil majors participate in the project seems to provide such guarantees, as these companies would get transit privileges for transporting their crude through the pipeline. Indeed, some energy experts suggest that Chevron could be looking to access new European pipelines to move its Kazakh crude.

The idea of Kazakh oil competing with Russian fuel on the European markets cannot look very attractive to Russia’s oil majors. “An alternative to the Bosporus needs to be found, of course without leaving the competition from Kazakhstan the chance to take the place,” a TNK-BP spokesperson told the Moscow Times on September 5.

(Krasnaya zvezda, September 7; Vedomosti, Vremya novostei, Izvestiya, Moscow Times, September 5; Strana.ru, Gazeta.ru, September 4)

America and the oil slick

Source: The Pioneer [India]
By Sandhya Jain

If Iranian President Ahmadinejad is serious about opening a Euro-based oil bourse in Tehran to undermine the US dollar, now is the time to strike. Strategic experts believe that internationally, the mega strategic energy deals are slipping away from corporate America, whose strong arm tactics are alienating growing nationalist sentiment across the world.

Washington's use of the September 2001 New York terror strike to cynically assume a commanding position in oil and gas rich Central Asia has startled the international community, especially after the unwarranted invasion of Iraq and takeover of its economy by cronies of the White House. This has forced a major rethink in world capitals, and resource-rich regimes in the Gulf and Central Asia are responding to Russia and China, who are cooperating to combat America's monopolistic ambitions.

Pakistan is Washington's non-NATO ally in the war against terror, but has turned to China for economic development, as evident in troubled Balochistan. It is keen on an energy deal with Iran, bete noire of Uncle Sam, but the tripartite energy deal with India cannot take off due to Pakistan's status as the epicentre of jihadi terrorism. As a rising Asian economy, India is also engaging with the Central Asian Republics for better energy security, though its anxiety for American goodwill has upset Iran and caused a stalemate over the price of LNG.

Saudi Arabia, however, is moving out of the American orbit by sewing up energy deals with China and India, though Washington has compensated itself with the oilfields of Libya. Yet the unmistakable geo-political trend among oil and gas producing nations of the Gulf, Latin America, Africa and Central Asia is to avoid US oil companies in favour of nations that do not interfere in their internal affairs. America's high comfort levels with dictatorial regimes on one hand, and promotion of puppet democracies on the other, as per its corporate convenience, has diminished its value as a desirable economic and strategic global partner.

Central Asia is alert after the string of 'coloured' revolutions. America currently retains bases in Kyrgyzthan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan. But Uzbekistan asked it to vacate the crucial Karshi-Khanabad (K2) base after the failed Andijan riots. President Islam Karimov was warned by ousted Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze against American financier George Soros and West-funded NGOs; he promptly expelled the Open Society Institute, stifled other NGOs, and courted Russian President Putin. A gas deal with Russia's Gazprom is expected to affect America's hydrocarbon pipeline over Afghanistan to the Arabian Sea. Karimov has invited India to share an energy partnership along with Russia and China, a move that makes profound geo-political sense.

Meanwhile, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is pressing America to wind up its bases in Central Asia, especially as heightened tensions with Iran raise fears of another regional misadventure. Kazakhstan, which has enormous hydrocarbon resources, is also upset with President Bush, and even allies like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan favour a security relationship with Russia. Tajikistan made the Russian military base there permanent after President Putin's visit in October 2004, while Russia has a base at Kant in Kyrgyzstan.

China is very proactive in the region. There is a thousand kilometre pipeline from Kazakhstan's central Karaganda region to Xinjiang, part of an ambitious three thousand kilometre link to the Caspian Sea. China has also invested heavily in Russia's energy sector, especially Siberia's coal and oil. It is active in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Experts opine that Russia is leading the attempt to marginalise Western multinational oil companies. The move strikes a chord because the White House is dominated by a cartel of the oil and gas industry and some banker-financiers, and the oil-rich nations of Central Asia, the Gulf and Latin America prefer joint ventures with State enterprises rather than these rapacious multinationals. Thus, a very basic economic nationalism drives their tilt towards Russia and China. The West, used to more than a century of de facto imperialism in the oil and gas sector, finds itself on a sticky wicket.

The new oil-and-gas producer States and the key consumer Asian economies (China, India) are joining hands to forge State-to-State joint ventures and arrive at strategic energy security. Analysts say this could eventually diminish the role and status of OPEC in future. Russian leaders had cleverly positioned the Russian Federation to take advantage of global energy trends, and is now emerging as natural leader of the world's key producing and consuming powers.

Washington facilitated this process by its unacceptable oil greed in Iraq. In a path-breaking work, "The Bush Agenda: Invading the World, One Economy at a Time," Antonia Juhasz exposes the US corporate invasion of Iraq. So far, 150 US corporations have received a staggering $50 billion worth of contracts for the failed reconstruction of Iraq, even as a new oil law has opened the oil sector to private foreign corporate investment.

bushOrwell486width.jpg
Copyright © 2006 Nick Anderson, Houston Chronicle

Under the Geneva Convention, it is completely illegal for an occupying power to change the laws or political structure of the occupied country. Yet the United Nations and the international community have been idle bystanders as the Bush Administration has changed all basic economic and political laws, while totally failing in the primary task of providing for the security and basic needs of the Iraqi people. Thus, as many as 30 oil contracts signed by President Saddam Hussein with oil companies from all around the world, except the US, were simply cancelled. Iraq oil is now being guzzled by Chevron, Exxon and Marathon. And when you consider that some geologists believe that Iraq's oil reserves are larger or at par with those of Saudi Arabia, you can envisage a very slow American pullout from the region. No wonder the Central Asian nations with American military bases are no longer keen to play host to Uncle Sam.

America's obduracy has reinforced the global preference for State-to-State long-term agreements and contracts which serve the energy-security interests of nations, rather than private corporate entities. Russia's domination of oil and gas flowing to the West has helped it re-emerge as a global power in concert with its strategic partners. And, surprising as it may seem, Washington lacks the global leverage to refashion events in its favour.

August 29, 2006

The Proposed Iranian Oil Bourse

Source: www.informationclearinghouse.info

The Proposed Iranian Oil Bourse

Abstract: the proposed Iranian Oil Bourse will accelerate the fall of the American Empire.

By Krassimir Petrov, Ph.D.

I. Economics of Empires

01/19/06 "Gold Eagle" -- -- A nation-state taxes its own citizens, while an empire taxes other nation-states. The history of empires, from Greek and Roman, to Ottoman and British, teaches that the economic foundation of every single empire is the taxation of other nations. The imperial ability to tax has always rested on a better and stronger economy, and as a consequence, a better and stronger military. One part of the subject taxes went to improve the living standards of the empire; the other part went to strengthen the military dominance necessary to enforce the collection of those taxes.

Historically, taxing the subject state has been in various forms-usually gold and silver, where those were considered money, but also slaves, soldiers, crops, cattle, or other agricultural and natural resources, whatever economic goods the empire demanded and the subject-state could deliver. Historically, imperial taxation has always been direct: the subject state handed over the economic goods directly to the empire.

For the first time in history, in the twentieth century, America was able to tax the world indirectly, through inflation. It did not enforce the direct payment of taxes like all of its predecessor empires did, but distributed instead its own fiat currency, the U.S. Dollar, to other nations in exchange for goods with the intended consequence of inflating and devaluing those dollars and paying back later each dollar with less economic goods-the difference capturing the U.S. imperial tax. Here is how this happened.

Early in the 20th century, the U.S. economy began to dominate the world economy. The U.S. dollar was tied to gold, so that the value of the dollar neither increased, nor decreased, but remained the same amount of gold. The Great Depression, with its preceding inflation from 1921 to 1929 and its subsequent ballooning government deficits, had substantially increased the amount of currency in circulation, and thus rendered the backing of U.S. dollars by gold impossible. This led Roosevelt to decouple the dollar from gold in 1932. Up to this point, the U.S. may have well dominated the world economy, but from an economic point of view, it was not an empire. The fixed value of the dollar did not allow the Americans to extract economic benefits from other countries by supplying them with dollars convertible to gold.

Economically, the American Empire was born with Bretton Woods in 1945. The U.S. dollar was not fully convertible to gold, but was made convertible to gold only to foreign governments. This established the dollar as the reserve currency of the world. It was possible, because during WWII, the United States had supplied its allies with provisions, demanding gold as payment, thus accumulating significant portion of the world's gold. An Empire would not have been possible if, following the Bretton Woods arrangement, the dollar supply was kept limited and within the availability of gold, so as to fully exchange back dollars for gold. However, the guns-and-butter policy of the 1960's was an imperial one: the dollar supply was relentlessly increased to finance Vietnam and LBJ's Great Society. Most of those dollars were handed over to foreigners in exchange for economic goods, without the prospect of buying them back at the same value. The increase in dollar holdings of foreigners via persistent U.S. trade deficits was tantamount to a tax-the classical inflation tax that a country imposes on its own citizens, this time around an inflation tax that U.S. imposed on rest of the world.

When in 1970-1971 foreigners demanded payment for their dollars in gold, The U.S. Government defaulted on its payment on August 15, 1971. While the popular spin told the story of "severing the link between the dollar and gold", in reality the denial to pay back in gold was an act of bankruptcy by the U.S. Government. Essentially, the U.S. declared itself an Empire. It had extracted an enormous amount of economic goods from the rest of the world, with no intention or ability to return those goods, and the world was powerless to respond- the world was taxed and it could not do anything about it.

From that point on, to sustain the American Empire and to continue to tax the rest of the world, the United States had to force the world to continue to accept ever-depreciating dollars in exchange for economic goods and to have the world hold more and more of those depreciating dollars. It had to give the world an economic reason to hold them, and that reason was oil.

In 1971, as it became clearer and clearer that the U.S Government would not be able to buy back its dollars in gold, it made in 1972-73 an iron-clad arrangement with Saudi Arabia to support the power of the House of Saud in exchange for accepting only U.S. dollars for its oil. The rest of OPEC was to follow suit and also accept only dollars. Because the world had to buy oil from the Arab oil countries, it had the reason to hold dollars as payment for oil. Because the world needed ever increasing quantities of oil at ever increasing oil prices, the world's demand for dollars could only increase. Even though dollars could no longer be exchanged for gold, they were now exchangeable for oil.

The economic essence of this arrangement was that the dollar was now backed by oil. As long as that was the case, the world had to accumulate increasing amounts of dollars, because they needed those dollars to buy oil. As long as the dollar was the only acceptable payment for oil, its dominance in the world was assured, and the American Empire could continue to tax the rest of the world. If, for any reason, the dollar lost its oil backing, the American Empire would cease to exist. Thus, Imperial survival dictated that oil be sold only for dollars. It also dictated that oil reserves were spread around various sovereign states that weren't strong enough, politically or militarily, to demand payment for oil in something else. If someone demanded a different payment, he had to be convinced, either by political pressure or military means, to change his mind.

The man that actually did demand Euro for his oil was Saddam Hussein in 2000. At first, his demand was met with ridicule, later with neglect, but as it became clearer that he meant business, political pressure was exerted to change his mind. When other countries, like Iran, wanted payment in other currencies, most notably Euro and Yen, the danger to the dollar was clear and present, and a punitive action was in order. Bush's Shock-and-Awe in Iraq was not about Saddam's nuclear capabilities, about defending human rights, about spreading democracy, or even about seizing oil fields; it was about defending the dollar, ergo the American Empire. It was about setting an example that anyone who demanded payment in currencies other than U.S. Dollars would be likewise punished.

Many have criticized Bush for staging the war in Iraq in order to seize Iraqi oil fields. However, those critics can't explain why Bush would want to seize those fields-he could simply print dollars for nothing and use them to get all the oil in the world that he needs. He must have had some other reason to invade Iraq.

History teaches that an empire should go to war for one of two reasons: (1) to defend itself or (2) benefit from war; if not, as Paul Kennedy illustrates in his magisterial The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, a military overstretch will drain its economic resources and precipitate its collapse. Economically speaking, in order for an empire to initiate and conduct a war, its benefits must outweigh its military and social costs. Benefits from Iraqi oil fields are hardly worth the long-term, multi-year military cost. Instead, Bush must have gone into Iraq to defend his Empire. Indeed, this is the case: two months after the United States invaded Iraq, the Oil for Food Program was terminated, the Iraqi Euro accounts were switched back to dollars, and oil was sold once again only for U.S. dollars. No longer could the world buy oil from Iraq with Euro. Global dollar supremacy was once again restored. Bush descended victoriously from a fighter jet and declared the mission accomplished-he had successfully defended the U.S. dollar, and thus the American Empire.

II. Iranian Oil Bourse

The Iranian government has finally developed the ultimate "nuclear" weapon that can swiftly destroy the financial system underpinning the American Empire. That weapon is the Iranian Oil Bourse slated to open in March 2006. It will be based on a euro-oil-trading mechanism that naturally implies payment for oil in Euro. In economic terms, this represents a much greater threat to the hegemony of the dollar than Saddam's, because it will allow anyone willing either to buy or to sell oil for Euro to transact on the exchange, thus circumventing the U.S. dollar altogether. If so, then it is likely that almost everyone will eagerly adopt this euro oil system:

The Europeans will not have to buy and hold dollars in order to secure their payment for oil, but would instead pay with their own currencies. The adoption of the euro for oil transactions will provide the European currency with a reserve status that will benefit the European at the expense of the Americans.

The Chinese and the Japanese will be especially eager to adopt the new exchange, because it will allow them to drastically lower their enormous dollar reserves and diversify with Euros, thus protecting themselves against the depreciation of the dollar. One portion of their dollars they will still want to hold onto; a second portion of their dollar holdings they may decide to dump outright; a third portion of their dollars they will decide to use up for future payments without replenishing those dollar holdings, but building up instead their euro reserves.

The Russians have inherent economic interest in adopting the Euro - the bulk of their trade is with European countries, with oil-exporting countries, with China, and with Japan. Adoption of the Euro will immediately take care of the first two blocs, and will over time facilitate trade with China and Japan. Also, the Russians seemingly detest holding depreciating dollars, for they have recently found a new religion with gold. Russians have also revived their nationalism, and if embracing the Euro will stab the Americans, they will gladly do it and smugly watch the Americans bleed.

The Arab oil-exporting countries will eagerly adopt the Euro as a means of diversifying against rising mountains of depreciating dollars. Just like the Russians, their trade is mostly with European countries, and therefore will prefer the European currency both for its stability and for avoiding currency risk, not to mention their jihad against the Infidel Enemy.

Only the British will find themselves between a rock and a hard place. They have had a strategic partnership with the U.S. forever, but have also had their natural pull from Europe. So far, they have had many reasons to stick with the winner. However, when they see their century-old partner falling, will they firmly stand behind him or will they deliver the coup de grace?

Still, we should not forget that currently the two leading oil exchanges are the New York's NYMEX and the London's International Petroleum Exchange (IPE), even though both of them are effectively owned by the Americans. It seems more likely that the British will have to go down with the sinking ship, for otherwise they will be shooting themselves in the foot by hurting their own London IPE interests.

It is here noteworthy that for all the rhetoric about the reasons for the surviving British Pound, the British most likely did not adopt the Euro namely because the Americans must have pressured them not to: otherwise the London IPE would have had to switch to Euros, thus mortally wounding the dollar and their strategic partner.

At any rate, no matter what the British decide, should the Iranian Oil Bourse accelerate, the interests that matter-those of Europeans, Chinese, Japanese, Russians, and Arabs-will eagerly adopt the Euro, thus sealing the fate of the dollar. Americans cannot allow this to happen, and if necessary, will use a vast array of strategies to halt or hobble the operation's exchange:

Sabotaging the Exchange - this could be a computer virus, network, communications, or server attack, various server security breaches, or a 9-11-type attack on main and backup facilities.

Coup d'état - this is by far the best long-term strategy available to the Americans.

Negotiating Acceptable Terms & Limitations - this is another excellent solution to the Americans. Of course, a government coup is clearly the preferred strategy, for it will ensure that the exchange does not operate at all and does not threaten American interests. However, if an attempted sabotage or coup d'etat fails, then negotiation is clearly the second-best available option.

Joint U.N. War Resolution - this will be, no doubt, hard to secure given the interests of all other member-states of the Security Council. Feverish rhetoric about Iranians developing nuclear weapons undoubtedly serves to prepare this course of action.

Unilateral Nuclear Strike - this is a terrible strategic choice for all the reasons associated with the next strategy, the Unilateral Total War. The Americans will likely use Israel to do their dirty nuclear job.

Unilateral Total War - this is obviously the worst strategic choice. First, the U.S. military resources have been already depleted with two wars. Secondly, the Americans will further alienate other powerful nations. Third, major dollar-holding countries may decide to quietly retaliate by dumping their own mountains of dollars, thus preventing the U.S. from further financing its militant ambitions.

Finally, Iran has strategic alliances with other powerful nations that may trigger their involvement in war; Iran reputedly has such alliance with China, India, and Russia, known as the Shanghai Cooperative Group, a.k.a. Shanghai Coop and a separate pact with Syria.

Whatever the strategic choice, from a purely economic point of view, should the Iranian Oil Bourse gain momentum, it will be eagerly embraced by major economic powers and will precipitate the demise of the dollar. The collapsing dollar will dramatically accelerate U.S. inflation and will pressure upward U.S. long-term interest rates. At this point, the Fed will find itself between Scylla and Charybdis-between deflation and hyperinflation-it will be forced fast either to take its "classical medicine" by deflating, whereby it raises interest rates, thus inducing a major economic depression, a collapse in real estate, and an implosion in bond, stock, and derivative markets, with a total financial collapse, or alternatively, to take the Weimar way out by inflating, whereby it pegs the long-bond yield, raises the Helicopters and drowns the financial system in liquidity, bailing out numerous LTCMs and hyperinflating the economy.

The Austrian theory of money, credit, and business cycles teaches us that there is no in-between Scylla and Charybdis. Sooner or later, the monetary system must swing one way or the other, forcing the Fed to make its choice. No doubt, Commander-in-Chief Ben Bernanke, a renowned scholar of the Great Depression and an adept Black Hawk pilot, will choose inflation. Helicopter Ben, oblivious to Rothbard's America's Great Depression, has nonetheless mastered the lessons of the Great Depression and the annihilating power of deflations. The Maestro has taught him the panacea of every single financial problem-to inflate, come hell or high water. He has even taught the Japanese his own ingenious unconventional ways to battle the deflationary liquidity trap. Like his mentor, he has dreamed of battling a Kondratieff Winter. To avoid deflation, he will resort to the printing presses; he will recall all helicopters from the 800 overseas U.S. military bases; and, if necessary, he will monetize everything in sight. His ultimate accomplishment will be the hyperinflationary destruction of the American currency and from its ashes will rise the next reserve currency of the world-that barbarous relic called gold.

About the Author: Krassimir Petrov (Krassimir_Petrov@hotmail.com) has received his Ph. D. in economics from the Ohio State University and currently teaches Macroeconomics, International Finance, and Econometrics at the American University in Bulgaria. He is looking for a career in Dubai or the U. A. E.

(In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. Information Clearing House has no affiliation whatsoever with the originator of this article nor is Information Clearing House endorsed or sponsored by the originator.)

August 23, 2006

Exxon Seeks Growth in Russia, Appeals for More Access Worldwide

Source: Bloomberg.com

Excerpt:

Exxon Mobil has only the $12.8 billion Sakhalin-1 development in Russia. The project, off the country's Pacific coast, is based on a production-sharing agreement signed with the Russian government in 1996. The Irving, Texas-based company began pumping oil there in October.

Exxon Mobil's next biggest rivals, Royal Dutch Shell Plc and BP Plc, have bigger investments in the country, including the Shell-led Sakhalin-2 project and BP's TNK-BP joint venture. Exxon Mobil, Shell and BP ventures so far have been mostly unaffected by President Vladimir Putin's campaign to increase government control over the Russian energy sector.

Russia pumped 9.68 million barrels of oil a day during the second quarter, more than any other nation, according to the International Energy Agency in Paris. Saudi Arabia was No. 2 with 9.01 million barrels

Crude prices have more than doubled in the past three years as growing demand for petroleum-based fuels strains production and wars, hurricanes, labor strikes and political unrest disrupt supplies.

International oil producers such as Exxon Mobil and Shell have more expertise than state-owned entities that control some of the world's biggest oil fields, Tillerson said. That expertise is required to fully develop difficult-to-reach reserves, he said

Each $1 increase in the price of a barrel of oil boosts Exxon Mobil's per-share earnings by 1.5 percent, according to Citigroup Inc. estimates.

Exxon Mobil, which pumps more oil than every member of OPEC except Saudi Arabia and Iran, is expected to have profit of $37.5 billion this year, based on the average estimate from 14 analysts surveyed by Thomson Financial. That would surpass last year's $36.1 billion, a record for any company in U.S. history

Shares of Exxon Mobil rose 38 cents to $70.21 in New York Stock Exchange composite trading. The stock has climbed 25 percent this year.

Tillerson said unilateral tax and royalty increases may discourage investment by international oil companies, jeopardizing future petroleum supplies.

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has raised royalties on oil companies and forced them to convert operating contracts to joint ventures in which the state oil company holds majority stakes. The U.K. has increased taxes on North Sea production twice in four years.

"Investment is needed across the industry,'' Tillerson said. ``And to encourage such investment, stable fiscal terms are needed, even in times of high earnings."

Exxon sold its 25 percent stake in Venezuela's Quiamare-La Ceiba oil field to Repsol YPF SA in December rather than convert its operating contract to a joint venture with Petroleos de Venezuela.

Since October 2004, Exxon Mobil's royalties on its Cerro Negro heavy-oil venture have risen to 33.3 percent from 1 percent. State-owned Petroleos de Venezuela SA has signaled it plans to take a majority stake in the venture

Exxon Mobil could also face higher income taxes. Venezuelan lawmakers are debating a bill that would raise the rate on heavy-oil ventures to 50 percent from 34 percent.

When asked whether Exxon Mobil would sue Venezuela over the changes, Tillerson said, ``I think there are a lot of other things we can talk about before we get to that point. I think that's down the road.''

Tillerson also noted that Exxon Mobil plans to increase production in Nigeria at a time when other oil companies are idling wells because of militant attacks and sabotage.

The company's Nigerian output will probably increase to 600,000 barrels of oil a day from 500,000, Tillerson said. The fact much of the company's operations in Nigeria are offshore has helped, he said.

The deepwater Erha field will drive much of the gain in production. The field began producing earlier this year.

August 01, 2006

No 'automatic' sanctions against Iran: Russia

Source: Iran Mania

Russia will clearly block any attempts at 'automatic' sanctions against Iran for refusing the package of incentives offered in exchange for discontinuation of their Uranium enrichment program. Since they have veto power in the Security Council, military action is out of the question.

Some excerpts:

LONDON, August 1 (IranMania) - A UN Security Council demand that Iran suspend uranium enrichment does not carry the "automatic" threat of sanctions, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak said Tuesday, AFP reported.

"Of course, no one is going to look at any use of force," he added.

"We are interested in a political resolution of the problem," he said.

If Iran does not suspend its nuclear work, the council would consider adopting "appropriate measures" under Article 41 of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which could be economic and political sanctions.

July 28, 2006

UN Security Council accord on Iran Nuclear Issue

Basically, Russia and China have blocked the US attempt to bring sanctions against Iran, at least until the end of August. Their energy contracts/deals with Iran are far more important in this era of flat petroleum production:

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060728/ap_on_re_mi_ea/un_iran_nuclear

UNITED NATIONS - The five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council reached a deal Friday on a resolution that would give Iran until the end of August to suspend uranium enrichment or face the threat of economic and diplomatic sanctions.
...
Because of Russian and Chinese demands, the text is weaker than earlier drafts, which would have made the threat of sanctions immediate. The draft now essentially requires the council to hold further discussions before it considers sanctions.

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